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ABSTRACT
Is credit as closely related to income as is money? Results present-
ed in the first half of this paper, based on a variety of methodological
approaches, consistently indicate that the aggregate of outstanding credit
liabilities of all nonfinancial borrowers in the United States bears as
close a relationship to U.S. nonfinancial activity as do the more familiar
asset aggregates like the money stock (however measured) or the monetary
base. In contrast to the asset aggregates, however, which exhibit little
overall difference among themselves in this context, total nonfinancial
indebtedness appears to be unique among credit aggregates in bearing this
close relationship to income.Moreover, additional evidence of offsetting
movements of the public and private components of total nonfinancial
indebtedness further substantiates the case for stability in the aggregate.
Thesecondhalf of the paper suggests three hypotheses that provide
internally consistent potential explanations for this phenomenon:(1) an
"ultrarationality" hypothesis which emphasizes acute perceptions and
offsetting actions on the part of the private sector, (2) a "capital
leveraging" hypothesis which emphasizes borrowing limitations and the
need for tangible collateral, and (3) an "asset demand" hypothesis which
emphasizes the private sector's role as a net lender. Initial efforts to
match these hypotheses against data for the U.S. household and corporate
business sectors yield only mixed results, however. The stability of the
credit—to—income relationship remains for the present a major puzzle,
therefore, although these three hypotheses do look sufficiently promising











It is curious that economic analysis has traditionally placed so much
more emphasis on money than on credit.
In the simplest abstraction to an economy with no privately issued
financial instruments, there is no such thing as credit, and money exists
only in the form of government—issued base money. The relevance of such an
abstraction is questionable, however, in a context in which there exist not
only privately issued financial instruments but also a large quantity and
rich variety of institutions whose business consists almost exclusively of
issuing and holding such instruments. In an actual economy like that of the
United States, most money is in fact not base money but bank money, and
privately issued financial instruments constitute the great majority of all
financial instruments held. Of course it is always possible to proceed on
the assumption that privately issued financial instruments exist but do not
matter much, so that the economy's privately issued liabilities simply offset
the remainder of its financial assets, and base money is once again all that
matters for economic activity beyond some level of disaggregated detail.
Although there have been some proponents of such a view,' it is nonetheless
inconsistent with the emphasis more typically placed on bank money as well
as base money in most analysis.
Once the analysis moves beyond an exclusive focus on base money,
however —therebyacknowledging that financial intermediation not only—2—
exists but also matters —economictheory provides no a priori reason
whatever to suspect a role for the nonbank public's money holdings but not
its credit liabilities. For given growth in base money, the behavior of the
banking system as well as of the nonbank public determines the growth of
both bank money and bank credit, and does so jointly with the determination
of the growth of nonbank financial instruments and of nonfinancial economic
activity. In theoretical analysis there is no justification for paying
attention •to the "money" side of this process while disregarding the "credit"
side. In applied analysis the most familiar argument for emphasizing money
while disregarding credit usually rests on some kind of implicit empirical
judgment that, especially for the United States, the arbitrariness associated
with defining "credit" measures is significantly more troublesome than the
arbitrariness associated with defining "money" measures. In a standard
example, whether a particular credit extension goes through the banking
system or the commercial paper market (or even the long—term bond market) is
presumably at most a second—order matter. Recent developments have done much
to vitiate this familiar empirical judgment, however, and there now exist
substantial and rapidly growing anomalies on the "money" side that are fully
comparable to those that have long been familiar on the "credit" side.
Surely it is also a second—order matter whether the public holds bank—issued
money market certificates (enabling banks to make direct loans), in which
case "money" increases, or holds commercial paper via money market fund shares
that may be checkable but are excluded from "money" nonetheless. More broadly,
the conventional inclusion in "money" of non—deposit claims against deposit—
issuing institutions (for example, seven—year saving certificates) contrasts
oddly with the exclusion of fully liquid claims against everyone else.
This paper's point of departure is the simple observation that, in—3—
the United States during thepost World War II period, the total amount of
debt claims issued in the credit marketsby all nonfinancial participants in
the economy has born a remarkably stablerelationship to nonfinancial
economic activity as measured bygross national product arguably, a more
stable relationship than that shownby the monetary base or by any of the
familiar "M" measures that include bankmoney. This observed stability of
the economy's aggregate nonfinancial debtratio, taken by itself, is not
necessarily surprising. That makes it surprising,however, is that the
economy-wide total has been so stable despite widevariation in the debt
issuing activity of the different sectors ofwhose claims the total consists.
In particular, households and nonfinancialcorporations have paced their
issuance of debt, in both the secularand the cyclical time frames, so as
almost exactly to offset the secular declineand cyclical variation in the
indebtedness of the federal government.
The paper's object is to make a beginning (forit is only that) toward
understanding the role that debt plays in the economicsystem and hence the
behavior underlying the observedstability of the debt-to—income relationship
in the United States. This line ofresearch appears, at least at the outset,
to be of potential value in severalregards in addition to the light it may
shed on more basic questions of economicbehavior. For example, some of the
hypotheses that may possibly explain the existenceof a stable debt ratio
have fairly direct implications for whetherfiscal policy either can provide
an effective economic stimulus or willmerely "crowd out" private activity.
Similarly, some of these hypotheses bear implications
for leverage structures,
in the sense of the mix of debt andequity by which individuals and businesses
in the private economy will finance theirasset holdings. The results of
such research also have potential implicationsfor the choice of target—4—.
variables for monetary policy, especially underthecurrently prevalent
approach that employs some endogenous variable (like money) as an inter-
mediate policy target. Finally, a major objective of this line of inquiry
is to call into question —and,if appropriate, to redirect the peculiar
balance—sheet asymmetry of current economic research that almost always
emphasizes money over credit, bank liabilities over bank assets, and public
assets over public liabilities.
Section I presents data for the U.S. economy's total nonfinancial
debt ratio and for its components by sector, and documents the ratio's
strong stability through comparisons based on several different methodologies.
Section II sketches the simple outlines of three alternative approaches to
explaining this phenomenon: specifically, an "ultrarationality" hypothesis,
a "capital leveraging" hypothesis, and an "asset demand" hypothesis.
Section III briefly inspects some evidence, based on U.S. household and
corporate sector balance sheet data, that may bear on the adequacy of these
possible explanations; it is important to emphasize at the outset, however,
that this paper stops well short of rigorously developing and testing any
specific hypothesis. Section IV briefly summarizes the paper's principal
findings, re—emphasizes some important caveats, and goes on to assess the
prospects for unravelling the underlying relationships among money, credit
and nonfinancial economic activity.—5—
I. The Stability of the Total Debt Relationship
The Basic Data. Table 1 presents data showing the yearend indebt-
edness of U.S. nonfinancial borrowers, as a ratio to fourth—quarter gross
national product (and multiplied by 100), for each of the twenty—six years
in the standard sample period beginning after the Treasury-Federal Reserve
Accord freed monetary policy from the wartime constraint of supporting
government bond prices. The first column of the table shows the total
credit market indebtedness of all U.S. nonfinancial borrowers. The next
five columns present comparable data dividing this total into the respective
indebtedness of each of five specific borrowing sectors. The table's final
column shows, as a memorandum item, comparable data (not included in the
total in the first column) for the debt issued in U.S. markets by foreign
borrowers.2 Figure 1 plots the total nonfinancialdebt ratio and its five
components by sector.
These data are "net" in the sense that they net out financial inter-
mediation. In other words, the data include such items as a household's
mortgage issued to a bank, or a corporation's bonds sold to an insurance
company, but they exclude any liability issued in turn by the bank or the
insurance company in order to finance that lending activity. The data also
exclude debt issued by separate financial subsidiaries of nonfinancial
corporations, as well as by federally sporsored credit agencies and mortgage
pools. The data are "gross," however, in the sense that they include all
of an individual household or firm's outstanding credit market liabilities,
not just any excess of liabilities over either financial or total assets,
and also in the sense that they include one household's borrowing from
another or one firm's borrowing from another.—6—
The strong stability of the total nonfinancial debt ratio, shown in
the top line in Figure 1 and the first column of Table 1, stands out in stark
contrast to the variation of the individual sector components. The non-
financial economy's reliance on debt, scaled in relation to economic activity,
has shown almost no trend and but little variation during the past quarter
century. During this period the total nonfinancial debt ratio has trended
slightly upward, with a low of 133.4 in 1956 and a high of 145.9 in 1964.
Not surprisingly, the ratio has also exhibited a slight cyclicality, typically
rising a point or two in recession years (when gross national product, in the
denominator, is weak). At 143.3, the most recent observation is nearly back
at the 1964 high.
The individual components of this total, however, have varied in
sharply different directions both secularly and cyclically. In brief, the
secular postwar rise in private debt has largely mirrored a substantial
decline, relative to economic activity, in public debt, while cyclical
bulges in public debt issuance have mostly had their counterpart in the
abatement of private borrowing. Households have almost continually increased
their reliance on debt in relation to their nonfinancial activity throughout
this period. Both corporations and unincorporated businesses have also
issued steadily more debt, on a relative basis, except for temporary
retrenchments during recession years. State and local governments steadily
increased their relative debt issuing activity during the l950s and 1960s,
but have just as steadily reduced it during the 1970s. Except only for 1975
and 1976, the federal government has reduced its debt ratio in every year
throughout the postwar period, although more slowly in years when recession
has temporarily inflated its deficit (and, again, depressed gross national
product in the denominator). These data on debt issuing activity by theTP.BLE 1
OUTSTANDING DEBT ISSUED BYU.S. NONFINANCIAL BORROWERS
Notes: Ratios of yearend levels to fourth—quarter gross national product
(seasonally adjusted annual rate), in percent.











1953 134.7 63.0 9.7 29.3 25.1 7.5 4.5
1954 137.0 61,5 10.9 31.3 25.5 7.7 4.4
1955 134.1 56.1 11.3 33.4 25.4 7.8 4.0
1956 133.8 • 52.0 11.6 35.6 26.6 7.9 4.0
1957 136.2 50.1 12.3 37.5 28.1 8.2 4.2
1958 137.4 49.6 12.9 38.2 28.5 8.3 4.5
1959 141.3 48.3 13.5 40.7 29.0 8.7 4.3
1960 144.0 46.8 14.3 43.3 30.5 9.1 4.6
1961 142.4 45.0 14.3 43.5 30.4 9.2 4.7
1962 143.7 43.8 14.5 44.9 30.9 9.6 4.9
1963 144.0 41.7 14.6 46.5 31.0 10.2 5.1
1964 145.9 40.4 14.8 48.5 31.4 10.9 5.5
1965 141.8 36.8 14.4 48.2 31.3 11.1 5.3
1966 139.7 34.5 14.2 47.6 32.1 11.4 5.1
1967 141.1 34.1 14.3 47.5 33.6 11.7 5.3
1968 139.9 32.7 14.2 47.1 34.2 11.6 5.1
1969 141.5 30.3 14.5 47.8 35.8 12.0 5.1
1970 143.6 30.2 15.0 48.3 37.8 12.4 5.2
1971 143.8 29.8 15.3 48.3 37.5 12.8 5.1
1972 141.9 27.9 14.9 48.5 37.4 13.1 5.0
1973 141.7 25.8 14.3 49.6 38.5 13.5 5.0
1974 144.0 24.8 14.4 49.8 41.3 13.7 5.6
1975 142.7 27.9 14.0 48.3 39.4 13.1 5.9
1976 143.6 29.4 13.6 49.2 38.7 12.8 6.5
1977 144.3 29.0 13.1 50.9 38.4 12.8 6.5

































































































































































































































federal government are especially enlightening in the context of the recent
widespread expressions of concern over the magnitude and import of the federal
deficit. During the post World War II period, the federal debt ratio has in
fact declined not just from 63.0 in 1953 but from 103.5 in 1946. Moreover,
at 28.0 as of yearend 1978, the ratio of federal indebtedness to gross
national product stands once again at almost precisely its value in 1918.
At the same time, it is also true that the past half decade has marked a
departure from prior experience in an important way. The years 1975 and 1976
were the first in the postwar period in which the federal government's debt
ratio actually rose, and the renewed decline in 1977 and 1978 has not yet
reduced the ratio to its prerecession low.
Although the principal focus of this paper is on the post-Accord
experience shown in Figure 1, it is also useful to consider briefly the
history of the debt ratio in a longer time frame.3 Figure 2 shows the size
and composition of the U.S. nonfinancial debt ratio (with corporations and
unincorporated businesses aggregated) for 1918—78. Apart from a one-time
adjustment associated with the fall of prices after World War I, the U.S.
nonfinancial economy's reliance on debt relative to economic activity has
shown essentially no trend over these sixty years. At 143 as of yearend 1978,
the debt ratio was virtually unchanged from 142 in 1921. Nonfinancial
borrowers' outstanding debt rose significantly in relation to gross national
product only during the depression years 1930—33, when gross national product
itself not only was well below trend but also was falling too rapidly for the
pay—down of debt to keep pace.4 Otherwise the economy's total nonfinancial
debt ratio has remained roughly steady throughout this period, and the post—
Accord stability appears to be in large part a continuation of a pattern that




































































































































































































Comparisonto Other Financial Ratios. Just how stable is the U.S.
economy's aggregate debt ratio? The question that immediately arises is,
stable in comparison to what? Given the traditional emphasis that economic
analysis has placed on the relationship between money and economic activity,
the usual money—income "velocities" provide a standard for comparison that
is sufficiently familiar to be a good place to begin.
Table 2 summarizes the stability of the ratios to gross national
product of ten financial aggregates by showing the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation normalized by mean) for each ratio computed from both
annual and quarterly U.S. data over the 1953-78 sample period (except for
the M3 money stock, for which data begin only in 1959). In each case the
table shows the coefficient of variation computed from raw data, and also
computed from detrended data. Among the debt measures included in Table 2,
"total net liabilities" is the total credit market indebtedness 'of non-
financial U.S. borrowers, as shown in column 1 of Table 1; "total liabilities"
is a broader measure that includes total net liabilities plus the credit
market indebtedness of U.S. financial institutions;5 "net non-federal
liabilities" is a narrower measure that only includes the net liabilities
of U.S. nonfinancial borrowers other than the federal government; net private
liabilities" is the analogous measure that excludes not only federal but also
state and local governments; and "bank credit" is the total of commercial
bankloans and investments in the flow—of—funds accounts. Among the asset
measures, the monetary base (currency plus bank reserves adjusted for changes
inreserve requirements), Ml (currency plus demand deposits), M2 (Ml plus
coinmerical bank time and saving deposits other than large negotiable
certificates), and M3 (M2 plus time and saving deposits at thrift institutions)
all follow standard definitions.6 "Net financial assets" is a generallyTABLE 2
STABILITY OF U.S. ASSET AND LIABILITY RATIOS
Annual Quarterly
Raw Detrended Raw Detrended
Assets
Monetary Base .165 .051 .168 .052
Money (Ml) .223 .036 .220 .036
Money (M2) .043 .029 .044 .028
Money (M3) .034 .019 .035 .018
Net Financial Assets .015 .014 .016 .015
Liabilities
Total Net Liabilities .025 .018 .020 .019
Total Liabilities .052 .016 .054 .018
Net Non-federal Liabilities .119 .041 .123 .041
Net Private Liabilities .124 .035 .126 .035
Bank Credit .068 .032 .068 .032
Note: Coefficient of variation of ratio to gross national product (seasonally
adjusted quarterly data, fourth quarter for annual data, at
annual rate).
Data from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Sample period is 1953—1978 (1959—78 for M3).—9—
broader measure that includes total holdings ofcurrency, deposits, and
credit market debt instruments by all U.S. nonfinancial holders(specifically,
thefive sectors broken out in Table 1); it is "net" in theanalogous sense
that itexcludesassets held by financial institutions, and therefore nets
outfinancial intermediation.
For both annual and quarterly data, the coefficients of variation
reported in Table 2 show an immediate contrast between those financial
aggregates that exhibit time trends in their respective gross national
product "reciprocal valocities" —includingthe monetary base, the Ml money
stock, net non-federal liabilities, and net private liabilities —andthose
that apparently have little or no trend. Judged on the basis of the
coefficients of variation computed from ratios of theraw data, the total
net liabilities measure (from the first column of Table 1)displays the
second steadiest relationship to gross national product out of the ten
aggregates included in Table 2. The only one that is superior is the
corresponding net aggregate on the asset side. None of the subtotals on
either the money or the credit side, including the much heraldedM2 money
stock, exhibits the stability of the two economy—wide net totals.
The coefficients of variation computed from the detrended ratiosare
more closely clustered, but again the net financial assets measure shows the
greatest stability, and total net liabilities follows closely behind. After
detrending, however, the total liabilities measure including the credit
market debt of intermediaries shows marginally morestability than the
corresponding net measure excluding them. Detrending improves the stability
of the ratios based on the other measures also, but inno case other than
the M3 money stock (for which the sample period is shorter)by enough even
to come close to the range of the three economy—wideaggregates. In light of—10--
the increased attention recently paid by many economists to the monetary
base, it is interesting to note that the stability of the base ranks tenth
out of ten among the detrended series, in both the annual and the quarterly
data.
The Covariance of Public and Private Debt Ratios. An argument for
the stability of an aggregate inevitably relies on some notion of negative
covariance among that aggregate's components. In the case of the economy's
total nonfinancial debt ratio, as shown in Figure 1 and Table 1, what makes
the stability of the ratio so interesting is in part the lack of stability
among the respective debt ratios of the several individual nonfinancial
sectors. Stability of the total debt ratio requires that movements in any
one sector's debt relative to economic activity typically be offset by
movements in the opposite direction in at least some other sector's debt.
Although casual inspection of Figure 1 and Table 1 suggests the appearance
of such a negative covariance relationship, the question is sufficiently
important to warrant more careful investigation.
A useful approach to analyzing interrelationships among economic time
series in this context is the vector autoregression.7 In brief, the vector
autoregression methodology first expresses each of a system of variables as
a function of lagged values of itself, lagged values of the other variables,
and a disturbance term; then solves this representation to express each
variable as a function of the entire history of the disturbances associated
with it and the other variables; and, finally, investigates the direction and
magnitude of the response of each variable to given independent shocks, or
"innovations," to any or all variables in the system. The vector auto-
regression is straightforward to estimate empirically, and simulation of the
solved-out system can then show whether innovations in particular variables—11—
result in system—wide responses consistent with specific hypotheses under
investigation.
Although in principle it would be possible to apply this vector auto-
regression methodology to as full a disaggregation of the total nonfinancial
debt ratio as could be estimated with the available data —forexample, the
five—sector breakdown used in Table 1 —theresulting profusion of partial
relationships would shed little light on the basic question of whether a
negative covariance between some nonfinancial sector's debt ratio and some
other's acts to preserve stability over time in the total. A simpler
approach, which not only renders the results more easily understandable but
also provides potentially useful insights for the discussion of behavioral
hypotheses in Sections II and III below, is to disaggregate only so far as
to distinguish the federal government's debt ratio and that of the private
nonfinancialsector (here including state and local governments). The
resulting vector autoregression is








where L is nonfinancial debt (L for liabilities), Y is nominal income (again
measured by gross national product), the G and P superscripts respectively
indicate the government and private sectors, the p. are disturbances, thea1
are fixed scalar coefficients to be estimated, and the B. are fixed—
13
coefficient lag operator polynomials to be estimated.
Solution of the autoregression (1), once it is estimated, yields a
moving—average representation of the form—12—
(LG/Y)t= +0012 pit
(2)
(]Y/Y) 021 022 112t
where the .and0.. are respectively fixed scalar coefficients and fixed—
coefficient lag operator polynomials derived from recursive substitution of
the a. and B.. from (1) to express both LG/Y and L/Y as functions of the
current values and past histories of both lii and 2• Although the normal-
ization convention imposed in (1) in order to estimate the system constrains







so that is "the LG/y disturbance" and 2 "the L/Y disturbance" in the
usual sense, in general the 111 and 112 series generated in the estimation of
(1) are not independent. Simulations of (2) to trace the time paths of rPiy
and L/Y resulting from specific movements of P and 2 would contain all the
information that the vector autoregression system can provide, but it is
easier to think intuitively about the implications of such a simulation when
it is possible to identify as its driving force an independent innovation in
either LG/Y or L/Y. Hence it is useful either to subtract out ofthat
part of its variation that is correlated with 2 so as to leave the residual
to represent the independent innovation in LG/Y or, alternatively, to subtract
out of 2 that part of its variation that is correlated with1J so as to
leave the residual to represent the independent innovation in L/Y. The
orthogonalization of (2) that extracts the independent LG/Y innovation (say,
for example, is simply
(LG/Y)t=l+1l12 it
(3)
(L/Y)t 2l 22 C2t
where the .areagain as in (2), the 4..elementsfor each lag follow from—13—
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The alternate orthogonalization that extracts as the independent innovation
in L/Y simply reverses the off—diagonal positions of 0 and A in (4) and(5),
with var (p1) replacing var in the denominator of (6).
Table 3 presents simulation results based on the vectorautoregression
system (1) estimated using U.S. annual data for 1953—78 (1960—78 forM3) with
two years of lags on each variable in each equation. Thetop half of the
table presents the results of simulating thesystem's moving—average represen-
tation (3), orthogonalized as in (4) and (5), to showthe time paths of the
G P . G responses of bath L /Y and L /Y to a 1% innovation in L /Y.By construction,
L/Y remains unaffectedcontemporaneously, so that in the initial year the
economy's total nonfinancial debt ratio (LG + L)/Y also risesby 1%. Within
the next several years, however, a gradualdecay in LC/Y and an offsetting
downward move in L/Y combine to eliminatevirtually all of the initial bulge
in the total nonfinancial debt ratio causedby a positive shock to the
government component. This pattern appears to be consistent withan under-
lying model in which the innovation in thegovernment debt ratio due toTABLE 3









Net Federal Liabilities Ratio:
Net
1 1.00% .00% 1.00%
2 .63 .06 .69
3 .51 — .11 .40
4 .46 — .25 .21
5 .43 — .32 .12
B.Responseto1%ImpulseInnovationinNetNon—federalLiabilitiesRatio:
Year
1 .00% 1.00% 1.00%
2 —.40 1.12% .72
3 —.47 .8]. .34
4 —.42 .50 .08
5 —.34 .29 — .05-14—
deficit spending subsequently stimulates income, thereby lowering the private
debt ratio unless private borrowing increases in pace, but it may be consistent
with other models too. The important feature of these results here is simply
that they document a negative dynamic covariance in the two major components
of the economy's aggregate nonfinancial debt ratio.
The bottom half of Table 3 presents the results of analogous simulations
based on the alternative orthogonalization that extracts€2 as the independent
innovation in L/Y. In this case the positive innovation in L/Y exhibits
some momentum effect in the second year (although the relevant standard error
does not permit rejecting at any reasonable confidence level the null hypothesis
that the second—year L/Y value is 1.00 instead of 1.12), but thereafter the
decay is fairly rapid. Moreover, the offsetting negative movement in LG/Y
appears immediately (that is, immediately after the one-period delay imposed
by construction) and in substantial magnitude. Hence the total nonfinancial
debt ratio achieves its original value again fairly quickly after a shock to
private borrowing also. In sum, both sets of results presented in Table 3
document the existence of offsetting movements within the aggregate debt ratio
and hence both quantify and reinforce the casual impression of negative
covariance given by Figure 1 and Table 1.
Comparison of Nominal Income Regressions. Simple ratios of precisely
contemporaneous observations may well fail to capture the relevant concept of
"stability" in the relationship among variables that move over time with some
general lead or lag pattern between them. Table 4 presents summary statistics
for single equations, estimated using U.S. quarterly data for 1953-78 (except
for M3), relating the growth of nominal gross national product to a moving
average of the growth of each of the ten financial aggregates listed in Table




































standard error of estimate
coefficient of determination, adjusted for degrees of freedom
Durbin-Watson statistic
period is 1953—1978 (1960—78 for M3).
TABLE 4









estimated in the familiar form
4 4
Am =a+ 3. Am Ft. + Aln Et. + (7)
i=0 1=0
where F is any of the five asset aggregates or five debt aggregates; E is
federal government expenditures measured on a full employment basis; a, the
.andthe y. are estimated scalar coefficients; and the .andy. are both
constrained to lie along fourth-degree polynomials with the implied
= == 0.
The implications of the results shown in Table 4 for the stability of
the different aggregates are, with few exceptions, roughly comparable to the
results of the simple ratio tests shown in Table 2. Net financial assets
again appears to have the most stable relation to gross national product,
with total liabilities, total net liabilities, and the M2 and M3 money stocks
ranking nearly as before.8 The most noticeable changes from the rankings
shown in Table 2 are the strong performance of the Ml money stock, which
ranks second on this criterion, and the poor performance of bank credit,
which here ranks last.
It would be interesting to know to what extent the rankings shown in
Table 4 represent a consistent stability or lack thereof over the entire
1953—78 sample, as opposed to one or more significant shifts in otherwise
fairly stable relationships. The Durbin—Watson statistic for bank credit,
for example —themeasure ranking tenth —showssignificant evidence of
positive serial correlation of the equation's residuals. Similarly, the
Durbin—Watson statistic for the monetary base —themeasure ranking ninth —
showspossible evidence of serial correlation. A recent accumulation of
evidence has shown that the Federal Reserve System's change in 1970, to a-16—
policy strategy placing greater emphasis on monetary aggregates, was more than
merely rhetorical as some critics have alleged.9 This change may well have
altered some of the relationships under consideration here. In addition, it
is possible that the Federal Reserve's removal of Regulation Q interest
ceilings from most large negotiable certificates of deposit in 1970 may also
have had an effect on some of these relationships.10 Hence 1970 is a
plausible time to expect a break on a priori grounds.
The first column of Table 5 presents F—statistics for a test of the
null hypothesis of no break at the beginning of 1970 in the regression
equations reported in Table 4. The only three measures for which it is not
possible to reject this null hypothesis at the .05 level are the two overall
net asset and liability totals (for which the margin of non—rejection is
minimal) and M3 (which has a much shorter pre-1970 sample period). For all
seven other measures the data provide significant evidence of a break at 1970.
The remaining columns of Table 5 present summary statistics for the
analogous regressions run over the shorter 1970—78 sample period. It is
interesting that the standard errors reported here are typically of about the
same magnitude as those shown in Table 4, but the fraction of the variation
of gross national product growth explained is much lower. These results
again confirm the strong stability of net financial assets and total liabilities,
and the only slightly less strong stability of the other credit measures (this
time including bank credit). On the money side, only the Ml money stock
performs comparably. For this short sample period the M2 money stock and the
monetary base rank respectively ninth and tenth among the ten measures examined.
In part because of the extent to which regressions of the form (7)
have been discredited by a variety of criticisms,U researchers examining the











significant at .05 level.
significant at .01 level.
Monetary Base 2.13* .00993 .02 2.14
Money (Ml) 2.67* .00897 .20 2.41
Money (M2) 2.79* .00962 .08 2.09
Money (M3) 1.59 .00947 .11 2.17
Net Financial Assets 2.08 .00840 .30 2.42
Total Net Liabilities 2.04 .00899 .20 2.48
Total Liabilities * 2.29 .00828 .32 2.45
. NetNon—federal Liabilities ** 4.82 .00894 .21 2.54
Net Private Liabilities 4.85** .00909 .18 2.47
Bank Credit 6.14** .00911 .18—17—
methods that relate the variation of income not to the entirety of the
variation of money but to that part of it which cannot already be deduced
either from the past history of money itself or from the joint past history
of both money and income. A more general representation of (7) that is
consistent with this interpretation (although for convenience omitting the
fiscal policy variable) is the vector autoregression
[in Ft a1
I =. (8)
[in Y a2 '2t
where the a. and B.. are again as in (l))2 The moving-average representation
of (8), orthogonalized so as to extract the independent innovation particular
to F (here E), is then
in Ft l2ltl =1÷1 I (9)
in
2J [21 22 621J
where the c., .and..areas in (3), orthogonalized as in (4)-(6).
Table 6 presents summary simulation results based on system (1)
estimated using the same quarterly data for the same ten U.S. financial
aggregates as in Tables 4 and 5, with eight quarters of lags on each variable
in each equation. Instead of reporting the individual response patterns for
F and Y separately and then for the "reciprocal velocity" ratio F/y, which
would be analogous to the procedure followed in Table 3 since ln(F/Y) =
lnF —inY, for convenience the table reports only the response of F/Y.
Moreover, instead of presenting the complete time path, the table presents
values only for the initial quarter and then for the final quarter in each
of the first five years.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ten financial aggregate ratios in response to a 1% innovation in the respective
aggregate. By construction, Y remains unaffected contemporaneously, so that
in the initial quarter each F/Y ratio also rises by 1%. After several quarters,
however, the bulge disappears from most of the ratios as Y rises or F declines,
or both. In the absence of a largely arbitrary judgment of the exact time
horizon that is relevant to the analysis, it is impossible to interpret these
results in other than a descriptive way. Even so, 'the comparisons are quite
suggestive. Among the five asset ratios, those for the Ml and M2 money stocks
and for the net asset total all decline rapidly albeit irregularly, while the
ratio for the M3 rrcney stock continues to rise through the first year before
then declining. The monetary base ratio over-corrects (although not signifi-
cantly so at usual confidence levels) and then remains persistently negative.
In sum, except perhaps for the over-correction of the monetary base ratio,
there is little to distinguish the respective simulation patterns shown by
these five financial asset ratios.
The same is not true for the five debt ratios, however. Here only
the total net liabilities ratio —again,the series documented in Table 1
and Figure 1 —andthe bank credit ratio (though to a lesser extent) return
rapidly and monotonically to their initial values after a shock to the
relevant aggregate. What is especially interesting in these results is the
contrast between the performance of the ratio for total net liabilities and
the ratios for net non—federal liabilities and net private liabilities (both
of which are just components of total net liabilities) as well as the total
liabilities measure consisting of total net liabilities plus the liabilities
of financial intermediaries. Both the net private liabilities ratio and the
slightly broader net non-federal liabilities ratio continue to move further
away from their initial values for two years in response to an innovation in—19—
the relevant aggregate, and neither shows any significant return to its
initial value within five years —hardlya demonstration of "stability."
Once net federal liabilities are included as well, however, the total net
liabilities ratio exhibits just as much stability in this context as doesany
of the five asset ratios. Moreover, proceeding to broaden the liability
measure further by including intermediaries' debt only results in lessened
apparent stability.
Among the various liability measures considered, therefore,
these results suggest that there is indeed something unique about total net
(that is, nonfinancial sector) liabilities. It is as if the Mlmoney stock
ratio were sharply unstable, but adding commercial bank time andsaving
deposits to form the M2 money stock ratio yielded stability, and further
adding thrift institution deposits to form the 143 money stock ratiodestroyed
that stability —noneof which appears to happen. Hence not only does the
total net liabilities ratio exhibit just as much stabilityas any of the five
asset ratios in these vector autoregression tests, it doesso uniquely among
the various debt aggregates tested.
The lower half of Table 6 presents the results of analogous simulations
based on the alternative orthogonalizaiton of (9) that extractsc2 as the
independent innovation in Y. In this case, by construction, it is F that
remains unaffected contemporaneously, so that in the initialquarter a 1%
innovation in Y generates a 1% decline in Fly. Subsequently,however, F/Y
rises as the innovation in Y decays or F rises, or both. Thepaths traced by
the ten asset or liability ratios are sufficiently similar,however, that
there appears to be little ground for distinguishingamong them here.
Evidence from More Complete Vector Autoregression Systems. One
element in the tendency of recent research to eschew relianceon simple
nominal income regressions of the form (7) has beenan increasing reluctance—20—
to focus on the relationship between money (or, here, debt) and nominal
income without distinguishing between the real and price components in nominal
income variation. Table 7 presents simulation results that are analogous to
those shown in Table 6 but based on the trivariate system
in Ft B11 B12 B13 in Fti
in X +B21 B22 B23
in +'2t (10)
in Pt O3 B31 B32 B33in -1 3t
solved for the corresponding moving—average representation
in Ft 6 012 013 Eit
in X ÷021 022 023 C2t (11)
in Pt 031 032 033 E3t
where P is the gross national product price deflator (1972=100), X is real
income (Y/P), and all other symbols are exactly analogous to their counterparts
in (8) and (9). Like Table 6, Table 7 again shows simulation results only
for the various asset or liability ratios, in each case solved simply as
ln[F/(X.P)] =lnF-lnX-lnP.The estimation and sample period are again
the same as for (8).
The three panels of Table 7 successively present results for the
simulation of (ii) orthogonalized to extract as the independent innovation
in F, to extract C2asthe independent innovation in X, and to extract C3as
the independent innovation in P. The responses of the asset or liability
ratios to an innovation in the relevant aggregate, shown in panel A, resemble
those shown in Table 6 for the analogous bivariate system. Considering the
roles of real income and prices separately does little to alter the earlier










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































totalnet liabilities (and, to a lesser extent, bank credit), in contrast to
instability of the ratios for liabilities measures that are components of the
total net liabilities aggregate. The responses to an innovation in real income,
shown in panel B, also largely resemble the responses shown in Table 6 resulting
from an innovation in nominal income. Again there is little to distinguish
the stability of one ratio from that of another in this context. The responses
to an innovation in prices, shown in panel C, bear some resemblence (with
appropriate sign changes) to the responses to innovations in the respective
aggregates from panel A, although some interesting differences emerge. Once
again the total net liabilities ratio appears to be quite stable despite
strong instability in its two components. In addition, the net financial
assets and monetary base ratios again appear stable, although with somewhat
more (temporary) over—correction than before in the latter. The notable
contrasts to the panel A results are the appearance of greater stability in
the ratio for the M3 money stock and less stability in the ratios for the Ml
money stock and for bank credit.
Finally, Table 8 presents simulation results for a four—variable
system including the Ml money stock, total net liabilities (LF), real
income and prices, estimated and solved analogously to (10) and (11) for the
vector [in Mt in in X, in P1'. The four panels of the table show
simulation results for the system orthogonalized successively to extract the
independent innovations in M, LT', X and P. In each case the table shows
the time paths of the individual responses of the four variables in the
system,together with the "reciprocal velocity" ratios for the money and debt
variables.
Inresponse to a one-quarter innovation in the money stock (panel A),















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mostly temporary positive response in the first year only, real income is
sharply higher in the first year but lower thereafter, and prices rise to a
new higher level within three years. The money ratio therefore at first over—
corrects (because of the strong real income response) and then stabilizes
with some small (and insignificant) oscillations. The debt ratio first
declines sharply but then returns essentially to its initial value. Here the
money and debt ratios appear to be of comparable stability. In response to
an analogous innovation in nonfinancial debt (panel B), the debt variable
remains enlarged throughout the five years, both the money stock and prices
are temporarily higher, and real income, after a small dip in the first year,
is irregularly higher throughout. The debt ratio therefore continues to
rise through the first year, but then declines fairly regularly toward its
initial value. The money ratio is first higher, and then persistently lower.
Here the debt ratio appears to be, if anything, more stable than the money
ratio. Finally, the responses to innovations in real income (panel C) and in
prices (panel D) provide little basis for judging the relative stability of the
money and debt ratios.
Overview. What conclusion does this battery of descriptive statistics
and assorted tests suggest for the stability of the relationship between the
U.S. economyts total nonfinancial indebtedness and its underlying nonfinancial
activity? At the very least, this collection of results indicates that the
stability of this relationship is just as strong as the stability of comparable
but more familiar relationships involving various definitions of the money
stock or the monetary base. Beyond that, the data repeatedly suggest that
the relationship for the total nonfinancial debt measure is more stable than
that for any of its underlying components.—23—
II. Three Possible Explanations of the Stability of the Debt Ratio
SomeFamiliarBasics. A fairly standard element of many simple models
of economic steady states is a fixed proportional relationship between the
flow of income and the stock of wealth.13 Moreover, under assumptions
involving such matters as the production process and the population age
structure, a fixed proportional wealth—to—income relation may also be charac-
teristic of models of steady—state growth)4 In either case the rationale
stems from the familiar view that the chief motive for holding wealth is to
derive the stream of services (broadly defined) that flow from various forms
of wealth, and that the demand for such services by individual maximizers is
(like the demand for nondurable consumption) proportional to income.
In the absence of claims issued by either the government or private
participants in the economy, the "wealth" that is (or may be) proportional to
income in such models consists entirely of tangible assets. In the presence
of financial claims, however, the wealth concept that is most plausible to
relate to income flows in this manner is presumably net worth, and exactly
how to define net worth becomes a potentially important issue. In a basic
model with financial claims but no financial intermediaries, the net worth
relation is either again simply
NW TA (12)
if the private sector "sees through the shell" of government and treats the
government's liabilities as if they were its own, or else
NW =TA+LG (13)
where NW is net worth, TA is tangible assets, and LG is again the government's
liabilities. An alternative way of stating (13), when the government's
holdings of financial assets are approximately zero, is
NW =TA+FA-L (14)—24—
where FA is total financial asset holdings and is again the private sector's
financial liabilities. Since all financial claims must be held,15
LG +L =FA. (15)
Finally, an alternative form of (15) that is relevant in the presence of
financial intermediaries is
G P I P I L +L +L =FA+FA (16)
where FA now distinguishes financial assets held by the private nonfinancial
sector, and L' and FA' are respectively the liabilities owed and assets held
by intermediaries.'6 Nothing in (12)-(16) changes if all variables are
measured as ratios to income a convention that is to be understood whenever
it is relevant in what follows.
In terms of these relationships, the basic phenomenon documented in
Section I is the strong stability of the sum L +LG(again, as ratios to
gross national product) for the U.S. economy. The stability of this stock—
flow relationship raises issues that are in part reminiscent of those involved
in the flow-flow relationship associated primarily with Denison [41 and
subsequently studied by others. In addition, as was noted at the outset, its
stability in comparison with financial measures more commonly used as a basis
for monetary policy discussions raises issues about the use of the money
stock (however defined) as the intermediate target variable, or more generally
as the most important information variable, for the conduct of monetary
policy.17 Even as a matter of purely basic research into economic behavior,
however, the results assembled in Section I naturally lead to the question of
why —inthe scientific sense meaning "how" —theeconomy's total non-
financial debt ratio turns out to be so stable.
An Ultraratioriality Hypothesis. In their analysis of the stability of
U.S. gross private saving in relation to gross national product typically—25—
known as "Denison's Law," David and Scadding [2] introduced an hypothesis of
"ultrarationality" which, after appropriate transformation from a flow—flow
context to a stock—flow context, also represents a possible explanation for
the stability of U.S. nonfinancial indebtedness in relation to gross national
product. Specifically, David and Scadding argued that individuals "see
through the shell" of both government and the corporation, so that personal
saving and corporate saving are close substitutes, as are personal consumption
and taxes. Hence, as Denison had noted earlier, total gross private saving
(the sum of personal saving plus corporate saving plus capital consumption)
not only is more stable than its individual components but also is apparently
unaffected by variations in the share of income absorbed by the government
sector. Moreover, David and Scadding concluded that the apparent invariance
of the gross private saving rate with respect to variations in the surplus or
deficit position of the government sector, also noted by Denison, implies a
close substitutability of private debt and public debt in private portfolios.
This same concept of "seeing through the shell" represented by
government and corporations also constitutes one possible explanation for the
stability of the economy's total nonfinancial debt ratio. If the private
sector regards the debt of government as equivalent to its own debt, then its
net worth statement in the form (14) should instead be
NW =TA+FA_(I?+LG) (14')
or, given (15), simply (12) again. Moreover, if households regard the debt
of corporations as equivalent to their own debt, then they will not
distinguish between direct and corporate liabilities within LiD. Under this
hypothesis, then, households would have viewed the decline of LG (here
including both federal and state-local obligations) from 72.7% of the gross
national product in 1953 to only 40.6% in 1978 as a decline in their own-26—
indebtedness, which they then slightly more than made up by increasing their
direct indebtedness (including obligations of unincorporated businesses) from
36.8% to 64.8% and by having corporations increase the indirect component of
L from 25.1% to 37.8%.
The essential point in this perspective is the existence of a stable
ratio to income not just for some undefined "wealth" concept, as is usually
assumed, or even for the more precise concept of net worth, but, in addition,
for the total assets and total liabilities components of net worth separately.18
Following the "services flow" rationale noted above, the main idea here is
that assets and liabilities each separately yield streams of services
(presumably negative for the liabilities), and that individual maximizers will
seek a quantity of each that is proportional to income. Hence, given any
variation in the government share of the overall liabilities total, for what-
ever purposes indicated by public policy objectives, the private sector
consisting of households and the corporations that the households own will
simply adjust by issuing enough debt to offset the government's action. Yet
a further elaboration of the same basic idea that changes nothing fundamental
would be to view corporations as also responding to independent objectives or
influences (for example, tax laws), and households as then adjusting their
debt positions to offset the given actions of both the government and the
corporations. In either case, the nonfinancial economy will seek (and achieve)
a, stable ratio of its aggregate liabilities toincome regardless of the
composition of that aggregate.
The "ultrarationality" hypothesis is interesting for a number of
reasons. From a purely behavioral standpoint, for example, it carries strong
implications about individuals' perceptions and about the motivating forces
underlyingfamiliar aspects of portfolio behavior. Moreover, as David and—27—
Scadding pointed out, it also implies that "ex ante crowding out" renders
fiscal policy impotent in both the short and long run.
A Capital Leveraging Hypothesis. In addition to the extreme view
that it embodies of individuals' ability to "see through the shell" of both
government and corporations, the ultrarationality hypothesis described above
rests importantly on two strong assumptions. First, it relies on the
presumption of a general absence of effective credit market constraints.
People are implicitly assumed not only to want to substitute their own (and
their corporations') indebtedness for government debt but also to be able to
do so. Second, it assumes not only that people want to hold their net worth,
total assets and total liabilities stable in relation to income but also,
because financial liabilities owed equal financial assets held, that they
hold their tangible assets and financial assets separately in stable
respective relations to income.
An alternative route to explaining the observed stability of the U.S.
economy's nonfinancial debt ratio is to abandon these two assumptions, as
well as that of "seeing through the shell," and instead to assume, first,
that the private sector does face credit market constraints and, second, that
it does not necessarily hold its asset ratio stable. If the private sector does
not view government debt as equivalent to its own, then it is clear from (13)
that, if LG declines (as has happened in the United States during the 1953—78
sample period examined in Section I), either NW must also decline or TA must
rise, or both. If the more standard assumption of a stable ratio of net
worth to income is approximately correct, then under this alternative view
the counterpart to the relative decline in government liabilities documented
in Table 1 and Figure 1 would have been a relative rise in the private sector's
holdings of tangible assets —presumablyincluding not only corporate assets—28—
in the form of productive plant and equipment but also private holdings of
residential real estate and consumer durables. Moreover, it is clear from
(14) that, if TA rises while NW remains unchanged, then either FA must decline
or L must also rise.
The potential importance of credit market constraints under this view
is most readily apparent in the household sector's debt arrangements. In
fact, borrowing against tangible assets in the form of home mortgage and
consumer installment credit has constituted the overwhelming majority of the
household sector's credit market indebtedness at least since World War II
(89% as of yearend 1978). Similarly, the borrowing of many corporations
consists primarily of explicitly secured long-term market debt, in the form
of mortgages or "first mortgage" bonds, and implicitly secured short—term
bank debt matched by inventory holdings.
Under the "capital leveraging" hypothesis to explain the stability of
the total nonfinancial debt ratio, credit market constraints effectively
prohibit the private sector from freely substituting its own liabilities in
place of the government's declining liabilities. Instead, the private sector
can increase its own liabilities only to the extent that it is also accumu-
lating more tangible assets with which to back them. The stability of the
U.S. nonfinancial debt ratio therefore reflects in the first instance an
increase in tangible assets in approximately the proportion necessary to hold
net worth fixed in relation to income as ownership of government liabilities
declines relative to income. By shifting outward the effective credit market
constraints, this relative increase in tangible assets then facilitates the
increase in private financial liabilities. From (14) once again, if private
liabilities increase fully in step with tangible asset holdings, then not
only net worth but also private financial asset holdings will remain stable—29—
inrelation to income.
This capital leveraging hypothesis also bears a number of interesting
implications that extend beyond questions of portfolio behavior and the
importance of borrowing constraints per se. Like the tiultrarationalityll
hypothesis, for example, it implies that the government deficit is a major
determinant of the economy's physical investment. Unlike that hypothesis,
however, it does not require that consumption move to offset tax payments.
Hence fiscal policy can affect not just the composition of income but also
its total.
An Asset Demand Hypothesis. Finally, a third approach to explaining
the debt stability phenomenon combines some elements of both of the two
hypotheses developed above.
According to the ultrarationality hypothesis, the private sector not
only acts so as to maintain a stable ratio of net worth to income but also
maintains separately stable ratios for both total assets and total liabilities.
A variant of that hypothesis would be to assume in addition the existence of
behavior enforcing stable ratios to income not just for total assets but, in
addition, for the specific components of that asset total —tangibleand
financial. In other words, the streams of services yielded by tangible and
financial assets are sufficiently weak substitutes that individual maximizers
exhibitstable demands for each separately in proportion to income. If
peopleseekto maintain a stable relationship between financial asset holdings
and income, then the market-clearing constraint (15) immediately indicates
that any relative decline in the given supply of the government's liabilities
will be matched by an increase in the demand for private liabilities. If
this demand is insensitive to such factors as yield (which is what a stable
ratio implies in this context), then a yield-sensitive supply of private—30—
liabilities will adjust so as to clear the market for financial claims at a
quantity that represents a stable ratio to income for total financial assets
held, and a ratio for private liabilities owed that rises so as to offset the
decline in government liabilities.
An alternative route to the same result is to combine with the capital
leveraging hypothesis the assumption of a stable demand for financial assets.
As the discussion above has already noted, it is clear from (14) that, if NW
is stable and TA rising (to offset the decline in LG), then either FA must
decline or must rise (or both). If, in addition, the demand for financial
assets bears a stable relation to income, then necessarily private liabilities
will rise.
In either case —thatis, under ultrarationality with a stable ratio
of tangible assets to income, or under capital leveraging with a rising
tangible asset ratio —thedistinguishing characteristic of the "asset demand"
hypothesis is the assumption of a stable, interest insensitive demand for
financial assets in relation to income. The supply of private liabilities
then adjusts, either just to clear the financial claims market or, alterna-
tively, to facilitate the holding of more tangible assets while holding no
less financial assets. Either way, a decline in government liabilities leads
to a rise in private liabilities.—31—
III. Some Evidence from Household and Corporate Sector Balance Sheets
The U.S. Aggregate Net Balance Sheet. As of yearend 1978 the consol-
idated balance sheet of the private domestic U.S. economy showed a combined
net worth of $7.3 trillion, consisting of $5.1 trillion of reproducible
tangible assets (valued at reproduction cost),19 $1.5 trillion of land (at
market value), $535 billion of net claims against the federal government
(excluding Social Security claims), $100 billion of net claims against state
and local governments, and $106 billion of SDRs, gold (valued at the official
price) and net claims against foreigners. The largest two holders of these
assets were households ($3.8 trillion, net of pension reserves and equity
claims on corporations and unincorporated businesses) and nonfinancial non—
farm corporations ($1.6 trillion).20
In order to avoid missing phenomena that may be lost in aggregation,
in examining the data to look for patterns that may shed light one way or the
other on the hypotheses outlined in Section II it is useful to focus at first
on the holdings of specific sectors rather than on fully consolidated totals.
Since households and nonfInancial corporations not only hold the great
majority of the economy's net worth but also account for most of the non—
federal liabilities shown in Table 1 and Figure 1, the object of this section
is to seek some perspective on the alternative hypotheses suggested in Section
II by examining movements in the balance sheets of these two sectors during
the post World War II period.
Households. Figure 3 plots the four chief components of the household
sector's balance sheet (with equity claims and pension reserves not netted
out) grouped as in (14), measured again as ratios of yearend stocks to















































































































































































































































net worth ratio —assumedto be steady in all three of the hypotheses
advanced in Section II —exhibitedsubstantial variation but little overall
trend through the early 1970s, first rising in the 1950s and then declining
in the 1960s. The continuation of the decline into the 1970s, however, has
resulted in a slight downward trend for the postwar period as a whole.
Within the net worth total, tangible asset holdings have risen irregularly
throughout this period, while the much larger financial asset holdings
(dominated by equity claims) have shown the rising and then falling pattern
also exhibited by net worth. As is already familiar from Table 1 and Figure 1,
households' liabilities have risen throughout, although the pace of the
increase was significantly slower during 1964—75 than either before or since.21
Although the large variation in the value of households' financial
asset holdings due to equity price movements makes it difficult to generalize
from these data, it does not appear that households have held their balance
sheet proportions fixed —asthe asset demand hypothesis put forth in Section
II would imply over this period. This variation is even more apparent in
Figure 4, which shows the almost continuously rising ratio of households'
total assets (tangible plus financial) to their net worth. Moreover, Figure
5 shows that the ratio of households' liabilities to their tangible assets —
whichthe capital leveraging hypothesis put forth in Section II suggests
should be stable —alsorose steadily until the early 1960s, although on
balance it has displayed little trend movement subsequently. Finally,
Figure 6 plots net worth and financial asset ratios for the household sector
that are analogous to those in Figure 3 but with equity claims and pension
reserves subtracted out. Here it is clear that, apart from changes in equity
holdings and pension reserves, the 1965—78 decline in financial asset holdings




















































































































































































































HOUSEHOLD SECTOR NETTED BALANCE SHEET
194?1952—33—
rise. Hence on this netted basis households have actually been increasing
their financial asset holdings just as they have been increasing their
tangible asset holdings, so that the ratio of their net worth to gross
national product has on balance shown a very slight increase over the entire
1953-78 period in contrast to the decline shown in Figure 3.
Simple inspection of these data for households alone yields conclusions
that are, on the whole, unsympathetic to all three hypotheses suggested in
Section II. Household net worth, including equity claims valued at market,
has not been steady but has declined in relation to income; netting out
claims against the government, as under the ultrarationality hypothesis,
would only make it show an even greater decline. Similarly, although house-
hold net worth with equity claims subtracted out has shown a very slight
upward trend, netting out claims against the government would still change
that to a pronounced downward trend. In addition, households have not
increased their outstanding indebtedness only in pace with their tangible
asset holdings, as would be the case under the capital leveraging hypothesis.
Instead, households have steadily borrowed more against these assets, thereby
substantially increasing their overall leverage. Finally, the ratio of
financial assets to income has not remained fixed either, as would be the
case under the asset demand hypothesis.
Nevertheless, a more careful examination of these data using vector
autoregression methods does suggest a response of households' liability
behavior to government borrowing, as is consistent with all three hypotheses
from Section II, as well as at least some response of households' tangible
asset holdings as would be implied by the capital leveraging hypothesis.
Table 9 presents simulation results for a three—variable vector autoregression
system including the ratios to gross national product of federal governmentTABLE 9
DYNAMICRESPONSESOF HOUSEHOLD SECTOR LIABILITIES AND TANGIBLE ASSETS




Response to 1% Impulse Innovation in Net Federal Liabilities Ratio:
Year
1 1.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2 .66 — .78 .05
3 .42 —1.09 .06
4 .19 —1.23 —.02
5 .03 —1.16 —.13
6 —.07 — .91 —.24
7 —.11 — . 54 —33
8 —.09 — .11 —.37
9 —.01 .28 —.37
10 .09 .60 —.32—34—
liabilities, household tangible assets (TAH) and household liabil3.ties (L'),
estimated using annual data and solved analogously to (10) and (11) for the
vector [ln(LG/Y), ln(TA'/Y)t, ln(LH/Y)t]1, and orthogonalized to extract
the independent innovation in LG/Y. Beginning in the second year, the house-
hold tangible assets ratio declines sharply in response to an innovation in
the government debt ratio. In addition, after a somewhat puzzling delay of
four years, the household debt ratio declines as well. While the tangible
assets ratio eventually returns to (actually above, though not significantly
so) its original value, as is consistent with proportional demands for the
stream of housing and other durable goods services in relation to income,
the debt ratio remains depressed through the tenth year. Although the
specific magnitudes and time patterns of these responses clearly require
further explanation, and further investigation using the underlying variables
rather than just ratios is necessary to distinguish portfolio responses from
income responses, these results do suggest at least some role for households'
behavior in accounting for the observed stability of the U.S. aggregate non-
financial debt ratio in ways consistent with the ideas advanced in Section II.
Nonfinancial Corporations. Figure 7 plots ratios for the same four
components shown in Figure 3, from the aggregate balance sheet of nonfarrn
nonfinancial business corporations. These data appear, if anything, even
more puzzling from the perspective of the hypotheses advanced in Section II.
The ratio of corporate net worth to income has moved more in step with than
against the household net worth ratio, so that there has been no observable
tendency for variations of the two to offset one another as the ultraration—
ality hypothesis might suggest. Corporate tangible asset holdings relative
to gross national product have shown an upward trend overall, as would be





























































































































































































































































in the late 1950s and early 1960s.22 Corporate financial asset holdings
relative to gross national product rose irregularly through 1973 and have
subsequently declined, rather than remaining steady as the asset demand
hypothesis would require. Finally, corporate liabilities have followed much
the same pattern as corporate financial assets, although with more amplitude
and somewhat more smoothness.23 As Figures 8 and 9 show, corporations have,
like households, increased their overall leverage either by borrowing more
against their physical assets or by borrowing against their holdings of
financial as well as physical assets.
Once again, however, closer inspection of these data using vector
autoregression methods suggests conclusions more sympathetic to the hypotheses
in Section II, and in particular to the capital leveraging hypothesis. Table
10 presents simulation results analogous to those in Table 9, for a three—
variable vector autoregression system including the ratios to gross national
product of federal government liabilities, corporate tangible assets (TAC)
and corporate liabilities (LC), estimated using annual data and solved
analogously to (10) and (11) for the vector [1n(LG/Y), 1n(TA1/Y), ln(LC/Y)jI,
and orthogonalized to extract the independent innovation in LG/Y. Here the
innovation in the government debt ratio immediately results in a large decline
in the corporate tangible assets ratio as well as the corporate debt ratio.
The effect of the original innovation on all three variables in the system
essentially disappears by the fourth year. Even more so than the results for
the household sector shown in Table 9, these response patterns appear approx-
imately consistent with what the hypotheses of Section II —andespecially










































































































































































































DYNAMICRESPONSES OF CORPORATE SECTOR LIABILITIES AND TANGIBLE ASSETS







3 .13 —.83 —.30
4 —.05 .10 —.10
5 .08 .42 —.05
6 .24 .26 —.09
7 .30 —.03 —.13
8 .25 —.22 —.14
9 .17 —.25 —.12













The analysis in this paper suggests several conclusions.
First, results based on a variety of methodological approaches —
rangingfrom simple inspection of ratios, to nominal income regressions, to
bivariate and more complex vector autoregression systems —consistently
indicate that the aggregate debt of all nonfinancial borrowers in the United
States bears as close a relationship to U.S. nonfinancial economic activity
as do the more familiar asset aggregates like the money stock (however
measured) or the monetary base. In contrast to the asset aggregates, however,
which exhibit little overall difference among themselves in this context,
total nonfinancial indebtedness appears to be unique among liability aggregates
in the stability of this relationship. Moreover, the data show evidence of
a negative covariance between the public and private components of total
nonfinancial indebtedness, thereby further substantiating the case for
stability in the aggregate.
Second, three hypotheses (that is, at least three) provide internally
consistent potential explanations for this phenomenon an "ultrarationality"
hypothesis which emphasizes acute perceptions and offsetting actions on the
part of the private sector, a "capital leveraging" hypothesis which emphasizes
credit market constraints, and an "asset demand" hypothesis which emphasizes
market clearing and the private sector's role as a net lender.
Third, initial efforts to match these three hypotheses against the
data for the household and corporate business sectors yield mixed results.
Simple inspection of the data leads to impressions largely inconsistent with
any of the three, but the results of vector autoregression experiments are
more supportive, especially of the "capital leveraging" hypothesis.—37—
It is important to re—emphasize, however, that —aswas noted at
the outset —thesesimple experiments stop well short of rigorously
formulating and testing any of the three hypotheses at hand. One immediate
reason for caution, of course, is merely the usual important distinction
between descriptive statistics and test statistics, but other problems are
present too. Although the basic phenomenon documented in the first partof
this paper concerns the joint behavior of all nonfinancial borrowers in the
economy, the "tests" assembled in the latter part focus separately on
household and corporate behavior patterns. The relevant concept of non-
financial economic activity for this purpose is problematical as well.
Nominal gross national product is not necessarily the best measure even for
aggregate-level investigations, despite its conventional acceptance in
analogous contexts, and it is even more questionable for issues focused
specifically on household or corporate sector activity. Allowing in some
way a role for equity claims, along with the debt claims, wouldbroaden but
no doubt also further complicate the analysis.
Nevertheless, even on the basis of the results reported in this
paper, the case for some redirection of "monetary" economics researchtoward
the nonbank public's liabilities as well as its assets appears warranted.—38—
Appendix
The othogonalization procedure outlined in (3)—(6) in Section I
constructs the independent innovation as that part of the underlying vector
autoregression disturbance which excludes all contemporaneous covariation
between and j2,andconstructs the analogous independent innovation €2
as that part of p2 which excludes any contemporaneous covariation between
and This concept of what constitutes an "independent innovation" is
equivalent to ranking the variable in question last in a chain of causal
ordering. By contrast, the terminology employed by Sims [15] defines an
independent innovation €.insuch a system to include all contemporaneous
covariation among the underlying p. and any p., ji; this concept is
equivalent to ranking the i-th variable first. Presumably some but not all
of the variation common to all variables actually is specific to the one in
question, so that the "truth" lies somewhere between these two extremes.
Tests indicate that the choice of ordering for purposes of the
orthogonalization —thatis, the choice of whether to include or exclude
contemporaneous covariation with other variables makes no substantive
difference in the simulation results shown in Tables 3 and 6-10 above. For
each of the ten bivariate systems examined in Table 6, for example, Table A—i
shows the respective variances, covariance and correlation of the underlying
and jidisturbances,and Table A—2 shows simulation results analogous to
those in Table 6 except that here the system is orthogonalized so that the
innovation labeled "independent" includes all of the contemporaneous'P2)
covariation. Although some of the correlations shown in Table A—i are hardly
small, the simulation results in Table A—2 are essentially unchanged from those
in Table 6.TABLE A-i





Monetary Base .1008 .6261 .0018 .01
Money (Ml) .1484 .6500 .0919 .30
Money (M2) .1881 .5406 .0545 .17
Money (M3) .1245 .2982 .0142 .07
Net Financial Assets .1048 .5848 .0866 .35
Liabilities
Total Net Liabilities .0702 .6569 .0676 .32
Total Liabilities .0990 .6958 .0975 .37
Net Non—federal Liabilities .4485 .6869 .0805 .46
Net Private Liabilities .0551 .6726 .0912 .47
Bank Credit .7788 .6503 .0859 .12
Notes: is the disturbance in the equation with the asset or
liability total as dependent variable.
is the disturbance in the equation with nominal income
as dependent variable.
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1. Among models familiar in the current literature, that of Brunner and
Meltzer [1] —inwhich money and credit are both determined as the
product of their respective endogenous "multipliers" and the exogenous
monetary base probably comes closest to representing this view. Even
so, Brunner and Meltzer have stopped well short of denying any signifi-
cance to the money and credit totals thus determined.
2. In part because of the capital export controls that were in force during
1964—74, foreign obligors accounted for only a small fraction of
borrowing in the U.S. markets throughout this period.
3. See Friedman [8] for a discussion of the postwar versus prewar periods.
Figure 2 below is from [8].
4. The debt ratio peak during 1918-78 occurred in 1933, the trough year
of the depression. In addition, much of the household and business debt
nominally outstanding during the depression was of questionable value.
5. The difference between the two is small, consistingforthemost part of J_ ££J1LI aii £IL i Cj_i..
andmortgage pools. Most liabilities of financial intermediaries (for
example, deposits and life insurance and pension reserves) are not
classified as credit market liabilities in the Federal Reserve's flow—
of—fundsaccounts.
6. Because these four series are measured weekly or monthly, rather than at
the end of each quarter, itisnecessary to determine how to construct
theratios. The quarterly data use quarterly averages in the numerator.
The annual data use December averages in the numerator because this
method made the respective coefficients of variation smaller in every
case except the detrended M2 ratio; in that one case the value computed
using the quarterly average in the numerator is .027.
7. See Sims [15] for a discussion of the methodology and rationale underlying
the vector autoregression approach.
8. The effect of the shortened sample period for M3 is immediately apparent
fromthe contrast between the small standard error and the large (but
not all thatlarge) R2.9. For leading examples of this evidence, see De Rosa and Stern [3],
Diggins [5], Feige and McGee [6], and Lombra and Moran[11].
10. Lindsey [10] has argued along these lines for the case of bank credit.
11. See,for example, Colcifeld and Blinder [9], Sargent [14], and Modigliafli
and Ando [13].
12. The use of levels of logarithms in (8) instead of differences of
logarithms as in (7) has essentially no effect as long as the lag
lengths of the Bjj are sufficient to provide roots near the unit circle.
(If no roots near the unit circle are needed, then the differencing in
(7) is incorrect in the first place.)
13. See, for example, Tobin and Buiter [16].
14. See, for example, Modigliani [12].
15. Some analyses distinguish between outside money and government debt, so
that (15) need not hold if the outside money is excluded from LG. The
data for LG used in this paper exclude currency but include the Federal
Reserve System's holdings of other government debt, so that only the
difference between the two would be at issue here. As of yearend 1978
currency outside banks was $99.1 billion and member banks' reserves
were $46.7 billion, against $118.6 billion of Federal Reserve holdings
of U.S. Government securities.
16. Just as (14) ignores the government's holdings of financial assets, (16)
ignores the equity (capital) position of intermediaries.
17. See Friedman [7] for an analysis distinguishing intermediate target
variables and information variables.
18. Alternatively, one could express the same concept as a stable ratio of
net worth to income plus a stable leverage ratio —defined,for
example, as the ratio of total assets to net worth.
19. The composition of the tangible assets included $1.9 trillion of
residential structures, $1.8 trillion of nonresidential plant and
equipment, $793 billion of business inventories, and $574 billion of
consumer durables.
20. The other holdings by sector were $805 billion for unincorporated non—
farm businesses, $629 billion for farms, and $490 billion for private
financial institutions (net of corporate equity claims, but including
pension reserves credited to households). These figures, as well as
the sector detail used throughout this section, are from unpublished
Federal Reserve Board data.21. In contrast to the data in Table 1 and Figure 1, which include only
credit market liabilities, the data shown here include all liabilities.
Most household liabilities are in fact credit market liabilities; the
difference, consisting of security credit, trade credit, and deferred
or unpaid life insurance premiums, was less than 4% of total liabilities
as of yearend 1978.
22. It would be useful in future research to divide the sharp post-1972
rise into quantity versus relative price components.
23. The liabilities data in Figure 7 also differ from those in Figure 1 and
Table 1 by including all liabilities.(See again footnote 21.) Of the
$l.179 trillion of nonfarm nonfinancial corporations' liabilities
outstanding as of yearend 1978, only $835 billion (just over 70%) were
credit market liabilities; the remainder included $282 billion of trade
debt, $22 billion of unpaid profit taxes, and $39 billion of other
miscellaneous liabilities.References
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